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EPISTEMIC RELATIVISM:  
INTER-CONTEXTUALITY IN THE PROBLEM 
OF THE CRITERION 
Rodrigo LAERA 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a view on epistemic relativism that arises from the 
problem of the criterion, keeping in consideration that the assessment of criterion 
standards always occurs in a certain context. The main idea is that the epistemic value of 
the assertion “S knows that p” depends not only on the criterion adopted within an 
epistemic framework and the relationship between said criterion and a meta-criterion, 
but also from the collaboration with other subjects who share the same standards. Thus, 
one can choose between particularist and methodist criteria according to the context of 
assessment. This position has the advantage of presenting a new perspective concerning 
both the criterion problem and the problem of inter-contextuality in the evaluation of 
different epistemic frameworks. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, “epistemic relativism” will be understood as the idea that there is no 
unchanging hierarchy of criteria for both the identification and assessment of 
different epistemic frameworks. This characterization of epistemic relativism 
refers to a rather uncontentious version of epistemic pluralism in the way that (a) 
there is more than one set of criteria that can legitimate an attribution of 
knowledge and (b) a ‘parity thesis’ which implies that no set of criteria is superior 
to the others.1 As such, there exist alternative epistemic frameworks2 without the 
necessity for some constant occurrence which gives origin to a group of criteria 
which are superior to others.3  
                                                                
1 For example: Maria Baghramian, Relativism (London: Routledge, 2004), Mark Kalderon, 
“Epistemic Relativism,” Philosophical Review 118, 2 (2009): 225-240. 
2 According to Pritchard, epistemic frameworks can be understood as clusters of epistemic 
principles which determine the epistemic standing of beliefs or knowledge. See Duncan 
Pritchard, “Defusing Epistemic Relativism,” Synthese 166, 2 (2009): 397-412. 
3 This must be clearly distinguished from the problem of epistemic over-determination as a 
common phenomenon – one can come to know the very same proposition P by testimony, 
visual perception, auditory perception, and so on – from the fact that one can consider the 
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On the contrary, epistemic realism, or epistemic absolutism, will be 
understood as the belief that there exists an unchanging group of epistemic 
relations which apply to all context and that said group can be discovered via 
philosophical reflection. As an opposition to epistemic relativism, it can be 
claimed that although the attributions of knowledge can change with their 
circumstances, at least some norm must fix said attributions so that individuals can 
attribute knowledge in distinct contexts. In the absence of shared norms or 
criteria for the attribution of knowledge, it would not be possible to compare the 
different ways of knowing the world and, in consequence, neither could 
relativism sustain itself.4 Against epistemic realism it can be argued that epistemic 
relations are, in fact, sensitive to their context. Each context is dependent on a 
determined epistemic framework and what is affirmed in one context can be 
negated in another without contradiction. Natural language not only 
communicates something in relation with the context of use, but also tells us 
something with respect to the context of assessment.5 The attributions of 
knowledge are statements which pertain to natural language; they are a part of 
and depend on it. In consequence, epistemic realism would seem to be false.6 
Despite the background differences, it is worth asking ourselves if it is 
possible to reconcile both positions, finding some sort of golden mean which may 
provide an explanation to the suspected disagreement that subjects in different 
contexts could experience towards a certain attribution of knowledge given that 
the criteria that constitute an epistemic framework are generalizations of 
particular attributions of knowledge. In that sense, while (a) relativism is 
defensible considering that epistemic frameworks are relevant to legitimize 
attributions of knowledge, it does not follow that (b) there are no criteria to be 
shared across different frameworks, which makes the same rules applicable to 
similar circumstances. Therefore, while thesis (a) is important to relativists, thesis 
                                                                                                                                       
reliability of said sources as a legitimate criteria for the attribution of knowledge. Thus, that an 
individual can know P from a range of sources does not mean that it can know P from a range of 
criteria; criteria and sources cannot be taken as similar concepts. 
4 Cfr. Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). More recently, see: Markus Seidel, Epistemic Relativism: A 
Constructive Critique (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).   
5 I follow MacFarlane’s distinction between context of use and context of assessment. See John 
MacFarlane, “Making Sense of Relative Truth,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian society 105, 3 
(2005): 321-339, or also by the same author: Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its 
Applications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
6 A similar argument can be found in Michael Williams, “Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism 
Is Not Relativism,” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4, 1 (2007): 93-114. 
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(b) is a statement that relativism could easily challenge arguing that frameworks 
and epistemic evaluation criteria cannot overlap themselves. The contribution 
about the suspicion of disagreement is supported on thesis (b) without assuming 
that criteria are fixed and unchanging.  
This paper proposes that one can agree with particularism – in which the 
instances of knowledge come prior to a knowledge criterion – or with methodism 
– where a criterion comes prior to knowledge instances –, according to the 
circumstances the assessor finds itself leading, in that way, to methodism and 
relativist particularism respectively. The sharing of such meta-epistemological 
principles enables an implicit agreement between the hierarchy of criteria and the 
instances of knowledge, which in turn will allow us to identify alternative 
epistemic frameworks to be assessed.  
Thus, the particular circumstances that the subjects of assessment go 
through converge with the epistemic norms of assessment criteria for the 
attribution of knowledge. In another way, the assessment criteria are a 
(theoretical) consequence of how subjects in a determined community cooperate, 
and of the success of said cooperation.7 To illustrate this point, we can consider the 
frequent debate between creationists and evolutionists. The creationists sustain 
that every living being is the result of God’s creation, an act performed in 
accordance with a divine purpose. In contrast, the evolutionists affirm that every 
living being on Earth descends from a universal common ancestor. Both would 
surely assess their respective attributions of knowledge in agreement with 
standards which pertain to their respective epistemic framework; a framework 
which they adhere to as a result of their particular circumstances. But they can 
understand each other, since they have points in common which permit certain 
cooperation. Even more, if a third party decided to assess both positions, it too 
would do so both according to the assessment criteria that determine its beliefs 
and in cooperation with other parties who share the same standards (even though 
these standards can often be implicit).8 Even though the reconciliation of 
relativism and absolutism and conflicting epistemic frameworks are two different 
                                                                
7 Cfr. Steven Hales, Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2006), to whom irreconcilable differences may lead to epistemic relativism, which arise when 
opposing parties cannot even agree upon the meta-criteria of a controversial statement. 
8 It never hurts to clarify the difference between an epistemic framework, a criterion, and a 
standard: Standards are epistemic norms which, combined into a whole, integrate an epistemic 
framework. A standard becomes a criterion when it is used for making judgments or decisions. 
Besides, the word ‘standard’ refers to a norm or set of norms that are normally followed, whilst 
the concept of ‘criteria’ is more far-reaching as it can encompass norms which are not 
frequently followed.   
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projects, if it could be proved that there is a connection among epistemic 
frameworks but that they change in time, then we would be advocating a middle 
ground between relativism and absolutism. 
The following section is dedicated to the problem of the criterion, in which 
we consider that the meta-criteria necessary to assess attributions of knowledge 
depend on both the context in which the assessor finds itself and on the 
collaboration with other subjects with whom it shares the same standards of 
attribution. Thus, these criteria can be just as particularist as methodist; if what we 
assess are daily practices, then they will be particularist, and if what we assess are 
standards, norms or epistemological theories, then we establish a methodist meta-
context. The third section will address the problem of epistemic relativism in 
relation with mankind’s capacity to successfully collaborate and to replace certain 
criteria with others which work better. Finally, we will use the Azande culture as 
an example to illustrate these points.  
2. The Problem of Criterion in Context  
According to relativism, the truth value of an affirmation or belief depends on the 
epistemic standard which is relevant in the assessment context. With this there is 
no neutral answer to the question of whether or not an affirmation or belief is 
correct; diverse standards can be used within the alternative epistemic 
frameworks. However, the idea that relativists assess and attribute knowledge via 
criteria that constitute an epistemic framework leads to the problem of how justify 
said criteria.     
Given a determined epistemic framework, the relativist justifies the 
formation of his beliefs – at least prima facie  – on the grounds of his own relativist 
criteria, and the creationist and evolutionist justify their beliefs with their own 
respective standards. Furthermore, such criteria can only be justified with 
particular beliefs which themselves are not assessed as relative. In such a way, we 
arrive at a variation of the traditional problem of the criterion. 
The problem of the criterion affirms the incompatibility of two 
alternatives:9 
(a) In order to recognize instances of knowledge and determine their extension, 
we need to know the knowledge criteria.  
(b) In order to know the knowledge criteria we need to recognize their 
instances.  
                                                                
9 Here I follow the Chisholm’s strategy to present the problem. See Rodrick Chisholm, The 
Problem of the Criterion (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1973) and The Foundations 
of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). 
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(c) We can neither know the extension nor know the knowledge criterion, 
because (a) and (b) are either equally true or equally false.  
However, we identify three possible answers to this problem. First, we can 
begin by specifying what counts as a legitimate method and use it in order to 
justify doxastic states (methodism). Secondly, we can begin by identifying 
particular cases of knowledge and investigate the use of these cases, to later assess 
general criteria (particularism). For example, Descartes, Locke and Hume can be 
considered advocates of methodism, while Reid is considered an advocate of 
particularism. This is owed to the fact that both Descartes’ rationalism and Locke 
and Hume’s empiricism try to establish the conditions necessary for the 
acquisition of knowledge, while Reid’s particularism tries to investigate the reach 
and extension of knowledge in order to later make generalizations. 
Both the methodist focus and the particularist focus have been effectively 
defended using naturalist conceptions.10 However, neither is sufficient to offer any 
type of neutral argument which impedes the satisfaction of relativist demands. In 
fact, for methodism, the criterion to determine instances of knowledge will be 
presented in the form of an unjustified meta-criterion – even if said meta-criterion 
comes from the same naturalistic rationale as the criterion itself – so, in the best of 
cases, its substantiation will be of circular nature. A similar process will occur for 
particularism because a certain set of rules will be required for every assessment of 
an instance of knowledge in order to consider it as fully-fledged knowledge. As a 
matter of fact, those epistemic frameworks which may have allowed attributions 
of knowledge to survive share some basic elements as the subjects that use any 
framework, for the sole matter of using it, show a degree of linguistic proficiency 
that can be semantically assessed by the means of rules accepted within the 
framework itself. In other words, for p to be taken as part of a set of knowledge, 
there must be a background of rules accepted within a specific epistemic 
framework. Whether we settle either for methodism of particularism, a dialectical 
deadlock will be reached because the controversy amongst particularists and 
methodists cannot be solved for reasons intelligible to the disputing parties. 
Following this line of thought, it can note – or distinguish – three principle 
characteristics of epistemic relativism, in relation with both the methodist and 
                                                                
10 An example of methodist focus can be found in Steven Luper, “Epistemic Relativism,” 
Philosophical Issues 14, 1 (2004): 271-295. However, an example of particularist focus can be 
found in Howard Sankey, “Witchcraft, Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion,” 
Erkenntnis 72, 1 (2010): 1-16; or also “Scepticism, Relativism and a Naturalistic Particularism,” 
Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy, 2015: 1-18. 
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particularist perspectives – besides allowing us to present relativism in a way that 
serves the purpose of assessing criteria depending on the context of the assessor. 
Particular relativism: 
(a) There are many ways to know the world. 
(b) The ways of knowing the world are determined by particular cases of 
knowledge. 
(c) All the particular cases that lead to knowledge of the world are equally valid. 
Methodist relativism: 
(a) There are many ways to know the world. 
(b) The ways of knowing the world are determined by criteria that pertain to the 
culture in which we live. 
(c) All of the criteria that lead to knowledge of the world are equally valid. 
Methodist relativism seems more plausible than that of the particularist, as 
the latter can be interpreted as subjectivism in which all beliefs or attributions of 
knowledge can be considered equally valid. The implausibility of this point of 
view is found in the fact that there can be cases in which S knows that man is a 
product of divine creation without the necessity to argue in favor of the standards 
which contribute to S’s knowledge, yet at the same time, there can also be cases in 
which S can both have this knowledge and argue in favor of said standards; both 
cases would be considered legitimate attributions of knowledge, and there is no 
epistemic difference between both them. Perhaps this position can be smoothened 
by interpreting relativism as a type of internalism, in sustaining that, eventually, 
one’s self-confidence guarantees the possession of knowledge.11 All attributions of 
knowledge use the first person as a reference, even though one may not be capable 
of correcting their own beliefs. For this correction to be possible the belief needs 
to be contrasted by, at the very least, another belief. In consequence, one’s self-
confidence must be coherent with a group of accepted beliefs – or an epistemic 
framework – so as not to end once again in the arbitrariness of subjectivism. For 
example, the particular belief that mankind is a divine creation must be contrasted 
and, later, be coherent with the theist epistemic framework in order for it to 
constitute knowledge. If we contrast this with the evolutionist epistemic 
framework, this theist belief will be corrected for its incoherence. 
                                                                
11 Internalism in the way the condition necessary to assess attributions of knowledge depends on 
some factor inside the subject’s mind and that, ultimately, it would be the subject’s confidence 
on its own abilities  (see, for example, Keith Lehrer, Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge, 
and Autonomy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). For an interpretation of internalism connected 
with relativism, see: Rodrigo Laera, Los desvíos de la razón: el lugar de la facticidad en la cadena 
de justificaciones (Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila, 2011).  
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The notion of coherence implies – implicitly or not – the existence of a 
group of beliefs which constitute an epistemic framework, which leads us to a slip 
from particularism to methodism, as the notion of coherence requires a previous 
criterion. Although the intuition of common sense continues to be preponderant, 
in this case it also constitutes a criterion for confrontation; we can differentiate 
the acceptance of an attribution from its respective criterion, since it is from 
common sense that one accepts attributions that, before becoming explicit, one 
could not have ever accepted; even so, in both cases (before and after becoming 
explicit) the criterion for acceptance would be the same.  
If the assessment criteria with which knowledge is attributed are shared by 
an epistemic community, then the assessor that endorses either the correctness or 
incorrectness of said criteria can only do so by means of a meta-criteria acting as a 
presupposition. But, what happens if the assessor also adheres to relativism, where 
no hierarchy of epistemic frameworks can be construed? Returning to the 
disagreement between the creationist and the evolutionist: If one considers that 
the creationist’s position as well as the evolutionist’s are correct within their own 
epistemic frameworks, then how can it be possible to concede a central role to the 
testimony of the Holy Texts or the word of God? And, similarly, how can it be 
possible to concede the same role to the Darwinian theory of natural selection? In 
this sense, the relativist position seems incompatible with both religious and 
secular points of view, as neither is treated as a trustworthy source of truthful 
beliefs which are independent of their epistemic frameworks. And, as the 
relativist considers himself incapable of offering validation from his own 
framework to another, independent epistemic framework, he will also be 
incapable of offering an independent assessment of the epistemic framework of 
some possible adversary.         
However, if the conditions necessary to semantically classify alternative 
meta-criteria were not to be found in an epistemic framework, then it would not 
be possible to offer any explanation on how to identify an unconnected epistemic 
framework provided it is necessary to identify them as such before assessing 
them.12 If one simply identified an epistemic framework with a group of standards 
that determine the subjective assessment of the attribution of knowledge, then 
this would cause the unfortunate result in that the creationist, the evolutionist and 
the relativist base themselves in exclusive epistemic frameworks, without any one 
being able to identify the others’ framework. Said in another way, if the subject’s 
                                                                
12 Radical relativist thesis on epistemic frameworks: there are epistemic frameworks completely 
different amongst themselves to the point there cannot be any possible translation from one to 
the other, thus making them totally incommensurable. 
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context determines their attributions of knowledge, then how is it possible to 
assess distinct contexts in the third person? How is it possible to affirm, then, that 
the creationist and the evolutionist disagree? How can one solve the problem of 
reporting knowledge in frameworks distinct from his own? Such problems have to 
do with the intuition that we possess the capacity to recognize other assessment 
criteria, and that the evolutionist and the creationist sustain contradicting 
theories. Otherwise it would be irrational to try and assess criteria that are not 
shared. 
If then in some contexts normal speakers would not reach the conventional 
meaning of the statements in which knowledge is attributed: despite being 
informed of all the relevant facts, these speakers would be incapable of making 
correct and literal usage of them. Normal speakers in this sort of context would 
find themselves confused concerning what requires the attribution of knowledge. 
However, one must keep in mind that the intuition of any competent speaker 
knows when he says that he knows. For example, let us consider that S is an 
ordinary speaker unfamiliar with the necessary and sufficient conditions that must 
be met to properly use a concept like ‘democracy’ in Ancient Greece. 
Nevertheless, S argues that Plato was against democracy, so one could state that ‘S 
knows that Plato was against democracy’ while being familiar with the concept of 
‘democracy’ in the Ancient Greek context. Hence, one could assume that 
whatever S knows is encompassed within certain specific criteria (those that 
uphold that ‘democracy is a representative form of government’) and that if one 
knows said criteria, then it cannot endorse that S knows that Plato was against 
democracy. In this way, it can be said an assessor is ‘competent’ when it is aware 
of the conditions of reference. If epistemic frameworks were disconnected 
amongst themselves – being the old frame different to the modern one – then no-
one could say that that someone knows that Plato was against democracy because 
it would be simply impossible to understand what ‘democracy’ meant in the 
Ancient Greek world. There is always a margin of ignorance about the criteria of 
other epistemic frameworks, but this margin does not prevent us of inter-
contextually assessing contributions of knowledge in other epistemic frameworks. 
Returning again to particularism, is it necessary to take samples of relevant 
individual cases in order to establish criteria? The Gettier cases – where the 
traditional consideration of knowledge as a ‘true, justified belief’ is challenged – 
are a good example that it seems inevitable to follow our intuitions, and that a 
large part of epistemology’s history is also sufficient evidence for this. Indeed, if 
with Plato it had been established that knowledge is true belief justified as a rigid 
or invariable criterion, then the history of epistemology would not have paid 
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attention to any supposed counterexample, since the Gettier cases would not have 
been appropriate. In consequence, there is something in daily intuition relevant to 
establishing epistemological meta-criteria. Above all, knowledge is something 
normal in man.  
In agreement with the application of criteria, one can opt for methodism or 
particularism, depending on the context in which the assessor finds himself. For 
example, when the assessment context has demanding standards – as is the case for 
a Cartesian epistemologist – surely methodism will be sustained. On the contrary, 
when the assessment context is not sufficiently demanding – as occurs in the case 
of those who participate in everyday assessments – then surely particularism will 
be relied upon to attribute knowledge. This position is adequate to resolve skeptic 
questions. Thus, in the contexts in which criteria appropriate to a philosophical 
conversation are applied, in which skeptic possibilities are considered, the criteria-
concerning standards for the attribution of knowledge are extremely high. 
Although different contextualists may affirm different things with respect to how 
these standards arise, this does not affect the idea that in said contexts it is false to 
say that S knows that he is not a brain in a vat and, therefore, that it is false to say 
that S knows that he has hands. Notwithstanding, in the non-philosophic context 
of ordinary life the skeptic possibilities are not considered, because the criteria-
concerning standards for the attribution of knowledge are low. In this context, S 
knows implicitly that he is not a brain in a vat, because he knows that he has two 
hands. The epistemic relativist can utilize the skeptic argument to establish that 
there are no rational motives to consider that an epistemic framework is 
subordinate to another. In as much as the skeptic judgment is rejected by a subject 
living in everyday life, one ends up accepting the skeptic argument, since the 
standards of assessment are automatically raised. Indeed, to negate skepticism 
appealing to everyday situations implies that he who negates does so from a 
philosophic point of view.  
All of this leads us to the consideration that there cannot be inter-
contextual judgments, and so neither is there an authentic disagreement between 
parties. The skeptic can sustain that the attributions of knowledge that are carried 
out within everyday contexts are false, but the speakers in everyday contexts 
cannot directly reject the negation of knowledge expressed by the skeptics. One 
cannot deny what another affirms. Overall, what the skeptic is affirming is that S 
does know not that p in accordance with high epistemic standards, although this 
affirmation may be compatible with the affirmation that S does know that p 
according to the permissive, or low, standards of everyday life.  
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But, why is it that in some moments S knows that p and in other moments S 
doesn’t know that p? What does it mean that the criteria-concerning standards are 
sufficiently high or sufficiently low? These questions introduce the problem of 
relativism in terms of cooperation for the attribution of knowledge, since for 
conversations to function in both contexts one must implicitly accept distinct 
criteria for knowledge. And this implicit acceptance that happens within the same 
epistemic community will also happen in communities when, upon passing 
judgments, make use of very different criteria. Upon introducing the problem 
within the same community, the question is; what does it mean to say “implicitly 
accept a criterion in a determined context”? One can adhere to contextualism and 
sustain that both the changes of context and the changes of standards of criteria 
are induced by the dynamic of conversation. However, it is important to 
differentiate the notion of “context” from that of “epistemic framework.” This 
difference is clear because the contexts can change within the same framework. 
The attributions of knowledge are sensitive to context because they share criteria 
or meta-criteria. These criteria make the notion of “to know” change context, yet 
maintain the epistemic strength of its epistemic framework of reference.13 
When a conversation takes place – with others or with oneself –, a family of 
interrelated subjects is assumed. The pertinence of one subject establishes the 
continuity of the conversation without producing a rupture, while non-pertinence 
in a subject would produce such a break. Thus, in some cases we ask the question, 
“How does one know that p?” in order to know that he knows, while in other 
cases we directly inquire about what is known. This is not due exclusively to the 
epistemic frameworks in which we assess, but also to the very genesis of belief. 
With this, intercontextual judgments can be judgments about the truth values of 
the attributions of knowledge which occur under one epistemic framework, 
although the genesis of the beliefs can be the same. For example, the reliability of 
perception can be taken as a stable relation between the subject and the object of 
knowledge, although its content may change with the epistemic framework. The 
apparent perceptions of rain are reliably connected to a hierarchy of criteria above 
other possible beliefs in such a way that allows one to believe that it is raining. In 
consequence, the perception of rain justifies the belief that it is raining, as well as 
                                                                
13 Generally, contextualism sustains that a subject S knows a proposition p with respect to the 
epistemic standards of the moment of attribution – as Cohen and DeRose have sustained, for 
example (Stewart Cohen, “Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons,” Noûs 33, 
no. 13 (1999): 57-89. Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and 
Context, Vol. 1: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
While relativism sustains that the truth – of sentences or propositions – is relative not only to 
the contexts of use, but also the contexts of assessment. 
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the belief that it is believed to be raining, all in virtue of different groups of 
reliable connections. In fact, the reliable connection of the perceptions of rain 
with the belief that it is raining make it so that said belief is justified in the 
Western epistemic framework as in other epistemic frameworks. Epistemic 
frameworks can be connected via criteria or meta-criteria that integrate them; 
these also allow that some frameworks imitate others when they are more 
successful.   
3. Epistemic Relativism and the Reliability of Perception in the Azande Case 
So far, it has been sustained that certain epistemological relativism can be both 
particularist and methodist provided two reservations are made. The first of them 
is that the existence of a hierarchy or ranking of criteria that make a source of 
knowledge reliable – and its assessment, legitimate – is put forward. The second 
one consists in upholding that the different epistemic frameworks are connected 
amongst themselves in terms of both cooperation and of success. These provisions 
make relativism so moderate that it would seem as though a middle ground has 
been reached between it and absolutism. Now, one argument that assumes that 
the relativist theory, as it has been exhibited in this paper, is erroneous can be 
presented in the following way: if we construct the fact that p is the case and 
another society constructs – even simultaneously – the fact that not-p is the case, 
it is possible that at the same time p and not-p are the case. But, how could there 
be a world such that, being one and the same, p and not-p be the case at the same 
time? 
In another way:  
(a) A community constructs the fact x, such that if x then p. 
(b) It is possible that another community has constructed the fact x such that if x 
then not-p. 
(c) Thus, it is possible that S knows that p and that not-p, if x is analyzed by S 
from an independent framework 
(d) In consequence, given that the principle of noncontradiction is unbreakable, 
relativism is not possible. 
Notwithstanding, this argument also can be presented as begging the 
question, as the same argument introduces at the same time a neutral criterion of 
rationality and a criterion of the impossibility of breaking the principle of 
noncontradiction. The previous argument tries to demonstrate that relativism is 
not possible or that the relativist position, at least, is found to be unjustified in 
such a way that there would not be any possible world in which p and not-p are 
assessed as true – always assuming an absolute principle that does not depend on a 
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specific framework. However, if one accepts epistemological pluralism, it can be 
expected that there be a culture that does violate the principle of 
noncontradiction, sheltered in its own epistemic framework.  
Recently, Bland has suggested that it is not necessary to respond to the 
criterion problem with the objective of resisting epistemic relativism, as it is 
always possible to attack the idea that all epistemic frameworks have the same 
value, establishing the superiority of one or more epistemic frameworks.14 This 
can be achieved via the revision of that which they have in common, focusing in 
how the criteria-concerning standards depend on one another, as much as for 
their justification as for their application. Of course, it is different to justify a 
standard than to apply a criterion. As Alston has observed, the normative 
generalizations only are applied to subjects that can govern their conduct with 
respect to these standards; small children and animals lack this capacity and both 
acquire an elemental level of knowledge.15 Therefore, there is an environment of 
application of the standard that is not generalized. The same occurs with the 
difference between criteria and meta-criteria. The first are generalized by the 
second, while the second are applied. There is an important distinction between 
an empiric explication about the genesis of the attributions of knowledge and the 
application of the standards that must be satisfied by beliefs in order to attribute 
knowledge.  
Take the anthropologic description developed by Evans-Pritchard of the 
Zande community as a sample of an epistemic framework diametrically opposite 
to that of Western culture.16 The Azande believe that some men are witch-doctors 
and that they can, through a psychic act, do harm. Witchcraft consists of an 
inherited substance in the bodies of witch-doctors, which is transmitted by 
unilineal filiation from fathers to sons: all the sons of a witch-doctor are witch-
doctors, and all the daughters of a witch are witches, but the sons of witches are 
not witch-doctors.17 Of course, this reasoning defies the most rooted logical 
                                                                
14 See Steven Bland, “Scepticism, Relativism, and the Structure of Epistemic Frameworks,” 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 44, 4 (2013): 539-544. 
15 See William Alston, “What's Wrong With Immediate Knowledge?” Synthese 55, 1 (1983): 73-
95. 
16 Edward Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976). 
17 According to Richard Jennings, “Zande Logic and Western Logic,” The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 40, 2 (1989): 275-285, the argument can be expressed in the following 
way: 
a) All witches, and only witches, have the substance of witchcraft; 
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intuition in the Western world: the principle of non-contradiction, with which 
one can more clearly see the begging the question when coherence is introduced 
as a preponderant factor in any epistemic framework.18 However, despite the 
logical inconsistency, the framework of magical beliefs functions in their 
community, as any inconsistency with a particular phenomenon is articulated 
with practical life, preserving their cultural identity.  
The Azande also believed that all unfortunate events were consequences of 
an act of witchcraft, placing their trust in the Poison Oracle. This oracle consisted, 
according to the description of Evans-Pritchard, in that each participant took a 
fowl, and once everyone who desired to consult with the oracle was seated they 
decided upon the questions necessary in order to give the most information 
possible to the seer. Then, the seer would pour rainwater on a leaf placed over a 
hole and place the poisonous dust on top. After making a paste, the seer would put 
part of the mixture in the beak of the fowl. One of the members would ask the 
first question and the seer would propose an answer. If the answer was correct, 
then the fowl would die. Otherwise, another dose of poison would be given to the 
fowl and another question would be formed, and so on. The characteristic of this 
method is that, for the natives, the oracle is infallible, since if the fowl does not die 
it is because some other mysterious power has intervened. That is to say, a sort of 
ad hoc hypothesis is looked for in order to safeguard their beliefs, but the 
efficiency of the predictions is never questioned.    
However, the Poison Oracle’s result is not informative unless it can be 
bound to regularities (natural or unnatural) and with reliable shared sources 
which may lead to shared criteria. Besides, Zande history allows us to think that 
epistemic frameworks, although different, have some criteria in common that 
allow their interpretation and assessment. For example, the Holy Scripture is 
revealed to the theologians by reliable sources – such as perception and memory – 
                                                                                                                                       
b) The substance of witchcraft is inherited by the children of the same sex of the witch-
doctor/witch; 
c) The Zande clan is a group of people biologically related between themselves by means 
of the male lineage; 
d) The man A of clan C is a witch-doctor; 
e) All of the men, in clan C, are witch-doctors. 
18 Triplett questioned that there is a radical difference between the Azande’s way of reasoning 
and that of a Western man, since the logical inconsistencies, like those of the Azande, are 
common in the natural language of any Western man (In: Timm Tripplet, “Azande Logic versus 
Western Logic?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1988): 361-366). See also: 
Steven French, “Partial Structures and the Logic of Azande,” Principia: An International Journal 
of Epistemology 15, 1 (2011): 77-105. 
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that are shared even by those who do not believe in the Holy Scriptures. Because 
both sources remain stable in time, it is possible to be Christian or not. In other 
words, the revelation of the oracles – as occurs in the revelation of the Scriptures – 
are reliable only while perception, memory, and inductive reasoning are reliable. 
Therefore, the use of these empiric methods undermines the oracular practices 
and the revelations of the Holy Scriptures. Both the Azande and the theologians 
cooperate implicitly with reliable sources, although they may wish to safeguard 
unreliable epistemic criteria with ad hoc hypotheses.  
Reliability is a meta-epistemological principle that is the product of the 
functioning of norms, and it is not another norm. For example, perception can be 
a reliable source in determined contexts, in which case it functions as a standard 
for the attribution of knowledge. Reliability is not a standard of knowledge, but 
rather is needed by perception in order to constitute this standard. Although the 
sources of knowledge may be different in the Zande case and in Western culture, 
both epistemic frameworks need their respective sources to be reliable. Therefore, 
although distinct criteria are applied, the reliability in one case and the other 
remains stable. What’s more, one can believe that a determined process is reliable 
without having an adequate reason and still not violate any intellectual obligation 
– the criterion that sustain said reliability would be put in doubt. Thus, the 
criteria-concerning standards are produced in a determined context without this 
altering the fact that they are reliable, even considering that it is a mistake to 
think of the disagreements between Western culture and that of the Azande in 
terms of a neutral arbitration. 
Although the application of any criterion implies that it can fail, since there 
can be another more important or more basic criterion that defeats it, the 
connection with other criteria will continue to be successful. This is because 
criteria cannot fail holistically. An epistemic framework cannot be abandoned in a 
general way, but rather the frameworks change through their connection with 
other epistemic frameworks beginning with their shared criteria. Suppose there is 
a conversation between a Western farmer and a member of the Zande community 
that wants to explain the cause of the bad harvest that year. The farmer will affirm 
that it is due to meteorological causes and that these causes will be related to 
empiric observations. The Azande can also think in meteorological causes –
although they lack the explicit concept of “causality” – but they will relate them 
to the substance of witchcraft. However, both will agree that the reliability of 
perception – the presence of the drought – gives place to an explanation. This 
starting point makes the disagreement between both cultures and both epistemic 
frameworks possible. Along these lines, the reliability of perception serves as a 
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shared criterion that bridges the cultural gap between a Zande and a Western 
farmer. Accordingly, from a particularistic relativism point of view it could be said 
that the instances of knowledge are equally valid in both cases and that, from a 
methodist relativism perspective, both criteria are valid depending on the 
epistemic framework. 
It could also be argued that if there were a set of privileged criteria within a 
hierarchy, then we would be facing some sort of criteriologic foundationalism. 
Classic foundationalism grants a privileged status to a group of basic beliefs, on 
which other beliefs support themselves in order to attribute to these first beliefs 
the character of knowledge, leaving the circumstances in the background. 
Relativism does not necessarily reject this conception, but rather states that it can 
be sustained with the exception that the beliefs be basic from the point of view of 
a determined epistemic framework. It can match distinct basic beliefs to another 
framework. The same occurs with reliability: a belief is reliable only within a 
determined epistemic framework. In this way, it is important to differentiate 
relativism in the attribution of knowledge from metaphysic relativism. The first is 
centered not only on the role of the context of usage and on the facts of the world 
that are sentences, but also on the context of assessment. Metaphysic relativism 
also considers the semantic interpretation as a function of the assessment of truth 
values, but with the difference that this assessment is nothing more than a 
description, in part, of possible worlds. As there are no worlds more truthful than 
others, the same facts that determine the functional values are relative and not 
absolute.19 
To privilege the context of usage allows that one put himself in another’s 
position, although they may be very different. But although one can place himself 
in another’s position, this is always done from a context of assessment. In this 
context the criteria of their framework are applied, proposing a determined 
interpretation – as Pritchard does when he describes the Zande culture. And, 
again, this is possible because two apparently distinct epistemic frameworks have 
shared criteria, although these criteria may occupy a distinct place in each 
framework – and not because there are possible worlds that act as references. The 
sentence “S knows that p” is an invitation to consider the facts in a certain way, 
since it represents how things are for who expresses the sentence. On saying that S 
knows, one finds themselves invited to think, what is it to know something, in 
such a way that S counts as someone who knows. If the invitation is accepted – if 
the criteria are cooperated with and the conversation takes place –, standards of 
                                                                
19 Cfr., Isidora Stojanovic, “The Scope and the Subtleties of the Contextualism / Literalism / 
Relativism Debate,” Language and Linguistics Compass 2, 6 (2008): 1171-1188. 
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knowledge are established that, for the purpose of the conversation, are correct. In 
this way, following Richard, an affirmation can be both an invitation to 
conceptualize things in a certain way, and a representation of how things are.20 On 
lacking an image of the affirmation on which objections to established norms or 
standards rest, the idea can be installed in S that there is only one notion of “to 
know that p,” although the extension can be determined by diverse criteria in 
distinct epistemic frameworks.  
Finally, returning to the difference between a farmer from a Western 
culture and the Azande culture, both can dialogue and realize inter-contextual 
judgments because both epistemic frameworks share some criteria, although both 
are capable of imposing different extensions (and therefore intentions) on 
sentences with the form “S knows that p.” The attributions of knowledge are 
displaced in order to form sentences in which they are correctly used, as long as 
they cooperate and do not resist the application of the criterion.  
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we have presented the problem of the criterion as a meta-
epistemological problem that does not require a definitive answer. Considered in 
the contextual reach of the attributions of knowledge, methodism or particularism 
can be applied in order to assess attributions of knowledge in distinct ways, 
depending on the context. Both options are bound to the processes that are 
established through a meta-criterion with which they cooperate – it is accepted as 
an assumption. Thus, the cooperation that is necessary for there to be negotiation 
between both parts and disagreement.  
Firstly, the notion of “S knows that p” with its respective variants is bound 
to accommodation of different frameworks. Epistemic attributions in different 
contexts (or in different subjects that use such expressions to frame their thoughts 
for themselves), have as a result that the uses of “S knows that p” in different 
speakers can have different truth vales, as in the case of the creationist and the 
evolutionist. But any of these speakers (or thinkers) can, in principal, recognize 
agreement or disagreement to their usages of “S knows that p”. 
In addition, the discussion concerning criteria is not merely metalinguistic. 
In the case of the creationist that chooses to argue with the evolutionist, they do 
not discuss whether or not one “knows” nor the application of this concept. They 
discuss the origin of the species that inhabit Earth, from distinct criteria with 
                                                                
20 Mark Richard, “Contextualism and Relativism,” Philosophical Studies 119 (2004): 215-242. 
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which, at least in part, they mutually collaborate – the same can be said of a 
supposed disagreement between the Western farmer and the Zande farmer.  
To conclude, any report made concerning the contradiction between 
subjects that pertain to distinct epistemic frameworks, finds itself mediated by its 
assessment criteria. The attributions of knowledge of the reporter also are made in 
accordance with different epistemic norms and, in this sense, relativism often 
accommodates itself well to inter-contextual demands21. 
                                                                
21 This paper is supported by The National Council for Scientific and Technical Research 
(CONICET, Argentina). 
